Fauci & Francis Collins & Daszak & Baric & dangerous coronavirus Gain-of-Function (GoF) research: it was stopped in 2014 but did they conduct illegal research outside the homeland & fund it with US $
by Paul Alexander
Did these people take illegal research offshore using US taxpayer money & did created & caused the COVID virus that killed so many? Is Fauci, Collins, Baric & Daszak the 4 Horsemen of Apocalypse?
Is this all a game and we are the low level players who really have no say?
See document below that stopped GoF research in 2014. How come did it go on? Must be have Fauci and Francis Collins in a courtroom now? Under oath. We need the answers. NIAID under Fauci continued to give grant money (US tax dollars) to Daszak’s EcoHealth Alliance. We need to know how and why? Was this legal? It was not! How could Fauci and Collins violate the rules and get away with it and look at what they caused.
SOURCE:
http://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/gain-of-function.pdf?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email
‘U.S. Government Gain-of-Function Deliberative Process and Research Funding Pause on Selected Gain-of-Function Research Involving Influenza, MERS, and SARS Viruses Gain-of-function studies, or research that improves the ability of a pathogen to cause disease, help define the fundamental nature of human-pathogen interactions, thereby enabling assessment of the pandemic potential of emerging infectious agents, informing public health and preparedness efforts, and furthering medical countermeasure development.
Gain-of-function studies may entail biosafety and biosecurity risks; therefore, the risks and benefits of gain-of function research must be evaluated, both in the context of recent U.S. biosafety incidents and to keep pace with new technological developments, in order to determine which types of studies should go forward and under what conditions. In light of recent concerns regarding biosafety and biosecurity, effective immediately, the U.S. Government (USG) will pause new USG funding for gain-of-function research on influenza, MERS or SARS viruses, as defined below. This research funding pause will be effective until a robust and broad deliberative process is completed that results in the adoption of a new USG gain-of-function research policy 1 .
Restrictions on new funding will apply as follows: New USG funding will not be released for gain-of-function research projects that may be reasonably anticipated to confer attributes to influenza, MERS, or SARS viruses such that the virus would have enhanced pathogenicity and/or transmissibility in mammals via the respiratory route. The research funding pause would not apply to characterization or testing of naturally occurring influenza, MERS, and SARS viruses, unless the tests are reasonably anticipated to increase transmissibility and/or pathogenicity.
In parallel, we will encourage the currently-funded USG and non-USG funded research community to join in adopting a voluntary pause on research that meets the stated definition. The deliberative process that will ensue during the period of the research pause will explicitly evaluate the risks and potential benefits of gain-of-function research with potential pandemic pathogens. The presumptive benefits that are generally identified in pursuing this type of research are stated in terms of enhanced ability for earlier awareness of naturally emerging dangerous pandemic pathogens or in the development of medical products in anticipation of such emergence. However the relative merits of gain-of-function experimental approaches must be compared ultimately to potentially safer approaches. The deliberative process will offer recommendations for risk mitigation, potential courses of action in light of this assessment, and propose methodologies for the objective and rigorous assessment of risks and potential benefits that might be applied to the approval and conduct of individual experiments or classes of experiments.
Although the gain-of-function studies that fall within the scope of research subject to the funding pause will be a starting point for deliberations, the suitability of other types of gain-of-function studies will be discussed. It is feasible that the discussion could lead to suggestions of broadening the funding pause to include research with additional pathogens, however, federal Departments and Agencies who fund, support, or perform research should be consulted prior to any additional pathogens being added to the scope of the funding pause. The deliberative process is envisioned to be time-limited, to involve two distinct, but collaborating, entities, and to be structured to enable robust engagement with the life sciences community. As a first step, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) will be asked to conduct the deliberative process described above and to draft a set of resulting recommendations for gain-of-function research that will be reviewed by the broader life sciences community.
The NSABB will serve as the official federal advisory body for providing advice on oversight of this area of dual use research, in keeping with federal rules and regulations. As a second step, coincident with NSABB recommendations, the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies then will be asked to convene a scientific conference focused on the issues associated with gain-of-function research and will include the review and discussion of the NSABB draft recommendations. This NRC conference will provide a mechanism both to engage the life sciences community as well as solicit feedback on optimal approaches to ensure effective federal oversight of gain-of-function research. The life sciences community will be encouraged to provide input through both the NRC and NSABB deliberative processes. The NSABB, informed by NRC feedback, will deliver recommendations to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Director of the National Institutes of Health, and the heads of all federal entities that conduct, support, or have an interest in life sciences research (including the Assistants to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and for Science and Technology).
The final NSABB recommendations and the outcomes of the NRC conference will inform the development and adoption of a new U.S. Government policy governing the funding and conduct of gain-of-function research. Upon adoption of a federal gain-of-function policy, the U.S. Government will declare the end of the research funding pause. The life sciences community will be informed of progress at regular intervals. The estimated time-line is six months for completion of the two deliberative steps (culminating in delivery of the NSABB recommendations to the HHS Secretary) and three months for the development, approval, and publication of the policy, with the goal of completing the entire process in less than one year from declaration of the research funding pause.’
Do not forget this key seminal paper in 2015 by MenachEry and Baric, telling us they just created the COVID pandemic chimeric GoF virus:
SOURCE:
A SARS-like cluster of circulating bat coronaviruses shows potential for human emergence
‘The emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS)-CoV underscores the threat of cross-species transmission events leading to outbreaks in humans. Here we examine the disease potential of a SARS-like virus, SHC014-CoV, which is currently circulating in Chinese horseshoe bat populations1. Using the SARS-CoV reverse genetics system2, we generated and characterized a chimeric virus expressing the spike of bat coronavirus SHC014 in a mouse-adapted SARS-CoV backbone. The results indicate that group 2b viruses encoding the SHC014 spike in a wild-type backbone can efficiently use multiple orthologs of the SARS receptor human angiotensin converting enzyme II (ACE2), replicate efficiently in primary human airway cells and achieve in vitro titers equivalent to epidemic strains of SARS-CoV.
Additionally, in vivo experiments demonstrate replication of the chimeric virus in mouse lung with notable pathogenesis. Evaluation of available SARS-based immune-therapeutic and prophylactic modalities revealed poor efficacy; both monoclonal antibody and vaccine approaches failed to neutralize and protect from infection with CoVs using the novel spike protein. On the basis of these findings, we synthetically re-derived an infectious full-length SHC014 recombinant virus and demonstrate robust viral replication both in vitro and in vivo. Our work suggests a potential risk of SARS-CoV re-emergence from viruses currently circulating in bat populations.’
Do not forget this grant with US tax dollars:
Do not forget this MIT publication:
SOURCE:
‘In 2013, the American virologist Ralph Baric approached Zhengli Shi at a meeting. Baric was a top expert in coronaviruses, with hundreds of papers to his credit, and Shi, along with her team at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, had been discovering them by the fistful in bat caves. In one sample of bat guano, Shi had detected the genome of a new virus, called SHC014, that was one of the two closest relatives to the original SARS virus, but her team had not been able to culture it in the lab.
Baric had developed a way around that problem—a technique for “reverse genetics” in coronaviruses. Not only did it allow him to bring an actual virus to life from its genetic code, but he could mix and match parts of multiple viruses. He wanted to take the “spike” gene from SHC014 and move it into a genetic copy of the SARS virus he already had in his lab. The spike molecule is what lets a coronavirus open a cell and get inside it. The resulting chimera would demonstrate whether the spike of SHC014 would attach to human cells.’
Do not forget this US government report:
SOURCE:
Do not forget this study by Ambati & Brufsky et al.: MSH3 Homology and Potential Recombination Link to SARS-CoV-2 Furin Cleavage Site
SOURCE:
MSH3 Homology and Potential Recombination Link to SARS-CoV-2 Furin Cleavage Site
‘Among numerous point mutation differences between the SARS-CoV-2 and the bat RaTG13 coronavirus, only the 12-nucleotide furin cleavage site (FCS) exceeds 3 nucleotides. A BLAST search revealed that a 19 nucleotide portion of the SARS-CoV-2 genome encompassing the furin cleavage site is a 100% complementary match to a codon-optimized proprietary sequence that is the reverse complement of the human mutS homolog (MSH3). The reverse complement sequence present in SARS-CoV-2 may occur randomly but other possibilities must be considered. Recombination in an intermediate host is an unlikely explanation. Single stranded RNA viruses such as SARS-CoV-2 utilize negative strand RNA templates in infected cells, which might lead through copy choice recombination with a negative sense SARS-CoV-2 RNA to the integration of the MSH3 negative strand, including the FCS, into the viral genome. In any case, the presence of the 19-nucleotide long RNA sequence including the FCS with 100% identity to the reverse complement of the MSH3 mRNA is highly unusual and requires further investigations.’
